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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the application of Space Micro‘s Time-Triple Modular Redundancy (TTMR™)
and Hardened-Core (H-Core™) technologies for mitigation of Single Event Effects in Xilinx Virtex-II field
programmable gate arrays (FPGA). TTMR is the application of time and spatial redundancy for mitigating Single
Event Upsets (SEU). H-Core is an auxiliary rad-hard chip used for mitigating Single Event Functional Interrupts
(SEFI). These technologies have been proven to perform in proton radiation environments and are presently the
driving force behind our powerful rad-hard computers built from COTS processors.
These same technologies with a few modifications have been applied to mitigate SEUs, configuration upsets, and
SEFIs in Virtex-II FPGAs. The application of TTMR and H-Core2 has been successfully demonstrated to mitigate
SEUs and SEFIs under radiation. The target system has been named the Proton300k™. The Proton300k is an ideal
reconfigurable computing platform for radiation hardened, high performance data processing at low cost and
outperforms similar systems built from expensive rad-hard electronics (from rad-hard processes).
1. INTRODUCTION

come close to the cost of a system designed using parts
which are based upon a radiation hardened process (a
process which is inherently tolerant to radiation
effects).

Reprogrammable FPGAs provide the system designer
with several advantages compared to those FPGAs that
are one-time programmable (OTP). One particular
advantage is due to their use of multiple programmable
memory cells (usually SRAM or Flash) that allow their
configuration to be changed not only during the design
phase, but also after installation into an operational
system if needed.

One of the widely used methods to build SEU hardened
systems based on Xilinx FPGAs is to employ Triple
Modular Redundancy (TMR). This approach to
designing an SEU tolerant system comes at the expense
of excessive area, power, and cost overhead. In
addition, using a TMR approach with Virtex FPGAs
increases the required I/O pin-count to 3 times the
original. This can a limiting factor on the size of the
design that can be mapped on the FPGA, and also
places constraints upon how the FPGAs may be
incorporated onto a circuit board.

This ability to be reprogrammed can however have
detrimental effects when it comes to using these devices
for aerospace applications. Single Event Upsets (SEU)
(or bitflips) may cause the data stored in these memory
cells to corrupt. Such errors may corrupt data, lead to
mission critical configuration errors, or even hang or
reset the FPGA (the latter known as Single Event
Functional Interrupts or SEFIs).

TMR for FPGAs requires that the voter itself be radhard, and normally this is implemented by using a radhard application specific integrated circuit (ASIC). This
adds even more complexity and additional power
requirements to the circuitry. In addition, the use of an
ASIC reduces the overall reconfigurability of the
fielded system.

There are several known techniques that can help to
mitigate SEU effects in SRAM-based Xilinx Virtex
FPGAs (which are the focus of this research),
Readback, Reconfiguration (full and partial),
Scrubbing, and Modular Redundancy, when used
individually or in combination can be used to mitigate
SEFIs and SEUs.

There has been some debate as of late as to whether
TMR is warranted for all missions [5]. Design trends
have shifted away from a focus purely upon providing a
radiation-hardened system, towards also keeping costs
down (while providing the same level of hardening and
circuit performance). There has been much focus in the

The published methods for eliminating SEUs in FPGAs
can result in great increases in the cost of the design.
The cost growth can become so prohibitive that it can
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rad hard design community upon developing methods
that would lessen (or nullify) the penalties associated
with providing rad hard solutions to the use of FPGAs,
while maintaining the advantages of FPGA
architectures such as those in the Virtex line.

The sensitivity of Xilinx FPGAs is shown in the
following radiation data[1], Figures 1 and 2. Both of
these SEU/SEFI cross-section curves highlight the very
low SEU and SEFI thresholds (approximately 1
Mev/mg/cm2), making these devices very sensitive.

The following sections discuss the proposed methods
that aim to aid designers in developing a SEU tolerant
system that is less expensive and provides an acceptable
level of performance without resorting to rad-hard
parts.

In summary, Xilinx based FPGAs suffer from the
following 3 major SEE problems:
•

Data SEUs: Single event upsets (SEU) in an
SRAM block dedicated to data. These SEUs lead to
the corruption of the data being processed by the
FPGA.

•

Configuration SEUs: SEUs in the memory cells
storing the configuration data can alter the
functionality of the FPGA.

•

FPGA SEFI: SEUs occurring in some areas of the
FPGA can lead to SEFI. These SEFIs (several
types of which are discussed below) lead to
improper operation of the device and are mitigated
by reconfiguring the device.

2. RADIATION EFFECTS IN XILINX FPGAs
The attractive feature of SRAM based FPGAs is their
ability to be reprogrammed. The way this feature is
implemented however can create problems under harsh
radiation environments.
The reprogrammable SRAM cells used in the Virtex
FPGA are highly sensitive to SEUs. Since almost all of
the functionality of the FPGA is dependant upon using
SRAM cells, more “chip area” is susceptible to SEUs.
Therefore, Xilinx FPGAs have more susceptibility and
are prone to a higher number of SEUs. An SEU in the
cells responsible for storing data corresponding to
control logic can lead to a SEFI. These SEFIs result in
the interruption of service, which can be quite
undesirable in most cases.

SEFIs in Virtex are classified into three different types
depending upon in which part of the FPGA the SEFI
has occurred.

Figure 1. Virtex II configuration memory cells (Texas A&M). Heavy Ions SEU Cross Sections for the X2V1000, X-2V3000, and X-2V6000
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Figure 2. Virtex-II POR SEFI Cross Section
•

SEFI in Power on Reset (POR): SEUs are random
in nature and can occur in any potentially sensitive
part of the device. An SEU in the POR circuitry
can lead to spurious transition on the reset line
leading to the loss of user and configuration data.

•

SEFI in Select Microprocessor Access Port
(SMAP): SMAP is a bi-directional interface that
can be used to read/write to an FPGA.

with microprocessors. In a later section, a description
will show how modified versions of these techniques
can be used with reconfigurable FPGAs, such as the
Xilinx Virtex family.
TTMR

•

TTMR is an SEU mitigation method based upon a
hybrid of both spatial and time redundancy.

JTAG: A SEFI in JTAG can result in the loss of
communication with the configuration logic.

Spatial redundancy is implemented by having multiple
copies of logic circuitry placed in parallel, and the same
operations are performed in each copy. Since the
probability of radiation striking and corrupting more
than one of the parallel logic elements is extremely low,
the resulting outputs of the multiple logic elements are
compared using a radiation hardened “voter” to
determine and select the correct result.

Previous research [13] has shown that reconfiguring the
Virtex-II FPGA without powering it down mitigates all
of the above SEFI conditions, however, reconfiguring
the device results in loss of valuable data.
Xilinx has proposed many different solutions to
mitigate the effects of SEUs. These solutions include
the addition of redundant logic, use of an external radhard ASIC, or/and the use of other features like
Readback and Reconfiguration, Scrubbing etc.
3. TTMR AND H-CORE: A QUICK REVIEW

Time redundancy is implemented by using a single
copy of logic circuitry which then executes a series of
operations at multiple, and therefore different, times.
The results are stored in a radiation hardened memory
location, and then compared using a radiation-hardened
voter.

The TTMR and H-Core methods were developed to
mitigate SEUs and SEFIs in microprocessors. Below is
a brief description of how the two technologies are used

TTMR combines these two techniques and exploits the
multiple execution units of a VLIW (Very Long
Instruction Word) processor to execute identical
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instructions in parallel. To increase the performance of
the processor, only two sets of instructions are run first.
The results of these two sets are compared and, in the
instance of a mismatch, time redundancy is used to run
the set of instructions again, and the results are then
compared using a voting algorithm.

At this point, another set of results is calculated. Either
ALU of the processor, or another ALU, can be used in
calculating the results of the “Third” set or “T”
instructions. The results of T and O are now compared.
If the results match, the M results were corrupted. The
O (and T) results are used (the M value is overridden).
This process is repeated until the end of the program.

The flowchart shown in Figure 3 shows the steps that
the TTMR algorithm follows. The algorithm starts by
loading and running the first instruction (or group of
instructions) of the program. “O“ and “M“ represent the
“Original“ and “Mirror“ copies of the instruction.

If O and T results do not agree, the T results and M
results are compared. If they match, the M results are
copied into the O results. The algorithm continues with
the execution of other instructions of the program.

The O and M instructions are spatially separated, by
executing them on the different ALUs (arithmetic logic
units) of the VLIW microprocessor. Doing this
eliminates the points of identical failures that might
occur in the two sets as in the case of a microprocessor
using time redundancy.

At this stage, if a disparity is found in the T and M
results, this implies that there was probably more than
one SEU during the execution, resulting in an
uncorrectable SEU. The probability of such an event is
extremely small, because this would indicate that SEUs
would have had to occur in separate ALUs within a
very small window of time (typically less than 10 clock
cycles).

The next step of the flow chart shows that the results of
the O and M instructions are then compared to see if
they match. If the results match, the current state of the
program is saved: the uncorrupted results of the O and
M are written back to the main memory. However, a
mismatch in the O an M results indicates the occurrence
of an SEU.

Space Micro successfully demonstrated TTMR using
51 MeV proton radiation at the UC Davis Nuclear
Laboratory. TTMR was able to detect and correct SEUs
on Texas Instruments 320C6000 DSP, and Equator
Technologies BSP-15 processor [16].

Figure 3: TTMR Algorithm Executing Three Copies of Programs/Instructions
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H-Core

indicating a problem. The H-Core chip responds by
exercising interrupts to the processor (escalating to
higher and higher priority levels) until the
microprocessor resumes its normal operation and
recovers from the SEFI. (See Figure 5.)

SEFI is a Single Event Upset (SEU) in the control logic
of electronics that leads them to enter into an unknown
state, and ultimately stop responding (hang). This can
result in loss of valuable data, or loss of their
functionality, or in most cases, both [6].
The previous state-of-the-art method of recovering parts
from an SEFI is to power-cycle the device after
detecting that the system has ceased to respond.
Various methods have been published to detect such a
condition.
A serious drawback of this solution is that the system is
inoperable for the entire duration from when the SEFI
occurs, through detection, until the power is cycled, and
the device is restarted. This is undesirable and in some
cases unacceptable.

Figure 5. H-Core Connected to Microprocessor

The Hardened Core (H-Core) device is built using a
radiation tolerant process (such as Silicon On Insulator,
SOI) and can be used for SEFI detection and mitigation.
H-Core acts as an external device (relative to the target
device to be monitored for SEFI events) that monitors
the target and is able to sense when an SEFI has
occurred. A photo of Space Micro’s H-Core chip is
shown in Figure 4.

If asserting the microprocessor’s interrupt lines does
not resume normal operation, then the H-Core can
exercise the reset signal and recover the microprocessor
in that manner.
The H-Core approach to SEFI mitigation is not just a
hardware solution, but also involves software. Software
routines are responsible for periodically asserting the
status signal to demonstrate normal operation. In
addition, the customized interrupt handler routines are
written in a way that provides a method of recovery that
can bring the processor back to normal operation, or in
the extreme, determine that recovery via interrupts is
impossible, warranting a full reset.
The effectiveness of H-Core depends in part upon how
fast the H-Core detects an SEFI and starts the recovery
process. Since there is very little overhead on the part
of the processor in asserting the status line (indicating
normal, SEFI-free operation), rapid monitoring and
detection with minimal effective decrease in
microprocessor throughput is easy to achieve.
Once a SEFI occurs, interrupts return the processor to
normal operation in less than 100 ns, or alternately
return the processor within 5-10 msec when reset is
required.

Figure 4: Space Micro’s H-Core IC.

Space Micro successfully demonstrated H-Core
operation on several processors when subjected to 51
MeV proton radiation, including Texas Instruments
320C6000 DSP, Equator Technologies BSP-15, Intel’s
Pentium, and IBM’s PowerPC [17].

The target device (a microprocessor for example) is
configured so that a dedicated status signal is
periodically asserted to indicate that it is operating
normally. Should an SEFI occur in the target device,
this periodic status signal would cease to be asserted,
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4. SEE MITIGATION IN FPGAs

•

In order to mitigate SEEs in FPGAs, the TTMR and HCore methods are employed. The specific
implementation of these must take into account the
internal architecture of FPGAs and their particular
sensitivity to SEEs.

FPGA purging control engine to control and
coordinate the scrubbing, readback, and any
reconfiguration that may be needed.

The response of H-Core2 to fault conditions on the part
of the FPGA is in part dependent upon the degree of
error the FPGA demonstrates. Simple one-time SEFI
errors may be corrected by a partial reconfiguration of
the FPGA. A major SEFI (for example, resulting in a
unallowable state or full hang in the FPGA) may
require a full scrubbing of the FPGA programming.

To detect/correct SEUs, TTMR requires that some type
of voting function be performed. An initial assumption
would be to implement the voting in the FPGA itself.
However, a voter circuit in the FPGA would not be a
reliable arbiter of the results since it too would be
susceptible to upsets. To solve this problem, the voting
function is performed outside of the FPGA by use of a
dynamically reconfigurable voter, a VLIW DSP being
one approach.

The degree of an SEFI therefore would need to be
interpreted, and a decision of some type made as to
whether the FPGA would need a full or partial
reprogramming. H-Core2 provides these functions, and
additional management is provided by the same
processor that is providing the TTMR voting function.

SEFIs in FPGAs result in the FPGA being in an
otherwise non-allowed or unstable logic state, and can
also result in corruption of the FPGA’s control
programming. Any SEFI solution for FPGAs must
therefore be able to restore the FPGA’s programming in
such an event. In order to do so, a non-corruptible copy
of the programming code must be available. Therefore,
the H-Core approach can be expanded to include such
capability and this forms the basis of H-Core2.

TTMR for SEU FPGA Protection
TTMR is Space Micro’s general algorithmic approach
towards the mitigation of SEUs. There are variants of
this approach however, that allows the system designer
to trade-off various factors. These variants can be better
understood by detailing the specific parts of a TTMR
implementation. Figure 6 shows how two separate
modules of logic (identical in function, but using
physically separated sets of logic gates) are used to
execute a set of operations upon the same input data.
The results of each are then fed to an external voter,
shown as a Ti DSP processor.

Hardened-Core2 Mitigation of SEFIs in FPGAs
H-Core2 provides a rad-hard external chip to oversee
the FPGA’s operation. In the event of an SEFI, HCore2 is able to perform a readback of the control code
to determine if the FPGA’s programming has been
corrupted. If this is the case, H-Core2 can initiate a
“scrubbing” of the FPGA to return it to a known state.
H-Core2 provides the following functions in order to
fully support SEFI protection in FPGAs:
•

Figure 6. Xilinx FPGA with Ti DSP as Voter

Polling circuitry to periodically check the normal
status signals which are sent from the FPGA to
indicate normal operation (or, to note the lack
thereof which would indicate an SEFI).

•

Readback circuitry to read FPGA configuration
data to determine if the programming has been
corrupted.

•

Rad-hard memory to store the FPGA programming
code to allow full restoration of the circuit.

•

Scrubbing circuitry to reprogram the FPGA as
needed.
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The execution of the logic (upon the inputs in modules
Ma and Mb) can be staggered to perform at different
times as shown Figure 7. In addition, if the results of
Ma and Mb (Ra and Rb) differ, the Voter will indicate
such and dictate that these operations are performed
again.
Multiple blocks of redundant logic circuitry (execution
modules), time staggering, and voting, are the building
blocks of TTMR. However, these can be utilized in
different ways, resulting in different TTMR algorithms
as shown in Figure 8.
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checked at each stage (there is not a cue of results
stored and compared as a block as in Algorithm 1) this
may result in overall slower operation of the target
logic. However, the gate count and circuit overhead of
such an approach is lessened.
This algorithm seems targeted towards environments
with higher expected SEU rates, and/or where gate
count should be kept as low as possible.
Figure 7. Time Staggered and Repeated Module
Execution

Algorithm 3 assumes that three full sets of logic
operations will be performed each time. The first-stage
“voting” of Ma and Mb is not even required. A vote is
performed with three full sets of results, and as long as
at least two of the results match, that result is used. The
third set of operations can be performed on one of the
originals modules (Ma in the figure) or a different logic
block can be used (Mc, not shown).
This approach introduces further trade-offs. If the
operations are always to be performed three separate
times, this means either the voter must make provisions
for storing the first set of results of the Ma/Mb
operations, or else the FPGA circuit design must
include an Mc for full parallel execution, which would
require a higher gate count.
The algorithms shown are just basic sets of options
available in a TTMR-based application. Additional
variations are possible. Each of these has its own set of
trade-offs that must be considered by the system
designer. Each of these may also have implications in
terms of its effectiveness in detecting and correcting
SEUs.

Figure 8. TTMR Algorithms

Combining TTMR and H-Core2

Algorithm 1 executes a block of logic operations
(modules) in succession, and stores the interim results
in memory (FIFO). These interim results are then
analyzed (for example by creating a checksum) as a
block, to determine if any SEU has occurred. If so, then
the entire set of logic operations is performed again in
order to have sufficient data to create a vote that
provides a corrected result.

Solutions for solving SEEs in the FPGA requires three
elements working in concert, as shown in Space
Micro’s Fault Tolerant Architecture in Figure 9. The
main components of the architecture are:

This algorithm seems to allow for more of the actual
target logic operations to be performed per unit time. If
the operational environment is one that creates a
relatively low number of SEUs, this approach may
provide the greatest throughput. However, this is at the
expense of using more circuitry and higher gate count,
since accommodation must be made to store the interim
results and perform the checksum on the data.
Algorithm 2 executes the logic operations (modules)
staggered over time. Since these logic operations are
Czajkowski, Pagey, Goksel, Bozek
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•

Reconfigurable SRAM-based FPGA executing the
target design, issuing periodic status signals to the
H-Core2 (and sending and receiving data that is
part of the target design’s normal operation).

•

H-Core2 to monitor the FPGA’s status signals,
detect any SEFIs, store the FPGA programming
code, and reprogram the FPGA when (and to the
degree which is) required.

•

Texas Instruments DSP that performs the voting
for TTMR protection of the FPGA, and controls
the H-Core2’s FPGA programming functions.
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TI
DSP

Figure 9. Fault-Tolerant (SEE Correcting) Architecture for Reconfigurable FPGAs
These elements may be combined in various ways. One
example of this (see Figure 10) forms the architecture
of Space Micro’s Proton 300kTM single board computer,
which incorporates a TI DSP, Xilinx VirtexII
reprogrammable FPGAs, along with H-Core2, TTMR
protection, data storage, and various interface options
(some of which are not shown).

5. RADIATION TEST RESULTS
A series of tests have been performed to determine the
viability of these approaches to mitigate SEEs in
reconfigurable FPGAs.
A test board using a 250K gate Virtex-II FPGA and a
TI TMS320C6713 DSP microprocessor was used for
demonstrating this approach. The TI DSP is a high
speed, low power microprocessor, which has shown to
have a TID rating of between 100-150 krad.
A proton radiation test on this prototype test bed was
performed at Crocker Nuclear Laboratory, University
of California, Davis. The test facility hosts a 76-inch
Isochronous Cyclotron providing Proton radiation
beam, simulating the near space environment by
irradiating the FPGA with varying flux performed the
test. A beam of 63MeV energy was used for the tests.
A photo of the test setup (at UC Davis) shown in Figure
11 consisted of the test board connected to a control
laptop and a SEFI switch in the radiation room. The
configuration is shown in Figure 12. The control laptop
was remotely accessed using a user laptop outside the
radiation room. Since this test is to demonstrate the
working of TTMR and H-Core2 in a Xilinx FPGA, only
the FPGA was irradiated while shielding the DSP.
(Previous successful SEU radiation testing of TTMR
and H-Core in VLIW DSPs has been completed [2].)
During the irradiation, a TTMR’d CORDIC DSP
algorithm was mapped on the FPGA. Inside of the DSP,

Figure 10. Proton 300k Computer
Czajkowski, Pagey, Goksel, Bozek

8

20th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

a TTMR’d software voter was operated in order to vote
the result.

TTMR Algorithm 1 (dual redundant TTMR with FIFO)
was tested in 7 separate sequences, all with successful
SEU detection. 2 of the sequences resulted in an
overflow of the SEU counter, which is due to the
limitations of the test configuration.
TTMR Algorithm 2 (dual redundant TTMR with no
FIFO) was tested in 13 separate sequences, all with
successful SEU detection. All of the sequences
overflowed the SEU counter.
TTMR Algorithm 3 (triple redundant TTMR) was
tested in 12 separate sequences, all with successful SEU
detection. SEU correction did work properly in these
instances.

Figure 11. UC Davis Proton Test Set

Some SEUs exhibited behaviors that resulted in SEFIlike conditions. H-Core2 was able to successfully
mitigate these.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Time-Triple Modular Redundancy and the H-Core
technologies were previously proven to detect and
mitigate SEUs/SEFIs in microprocessors. This enabled
several advanced, high performance processors to be
used in radiation-hardened applications, resulting in the
Proton 100k and Proton 200k computers. These same
methods have been extended to mitigate SEUs/SEFIs in
reconfigurable FPGAs.
The proposed solution for reconfigurable FPGAs offers
several advantages over other systems using traditional
methods such as TMR. TTMR and H-Core allow the
FPGA logic circuit to be run at near full speed, without
any extra circuit delays, because results can be
summarized into “grouped“ answers, where millions of
clock cycles can be run and a single answer can be
provided to the DSP. This also eliminates the high I/O
count required of traditional TMR techniques for Virtex
FPGAs. Secondly, use of a DSP as a voter has the
advantage of this voter being reconfigurable, since it
can be reprogrammed in DSP software. This compares
favorably to using a fixed, radiation-hardened voter
ASIC, which removes reconfigurability options.

Figure 12. FPGA Radiation Configuration
During the radiation testing, 32 different sequences
were completed, showing detection of SEUs in the
Virtex II FPGA logic in all test sequences. SEU
detection rate was 100%.
The test parameters were such that the number of SEUs
in a given period was many orders of magnitude
beyond any which would be seen in a real-world
application. This high rate overflowed the SEU counter.
The SEU counter is necessary in order for the SEU
correction mechanism to work properly. So, in some of
the test instances, SEU correction was found to not
work as expected.

The SEU and SEFI mitigation resulting from TTMR
and H-Core for reconfigurable FPGAs provides a very
efficient option for satellite applications. These
technologies are available in the Proton 300k hardware
platform that combines a Ti DSP (rated at 4,000 MIPS
with SEU mitigation) along with Xilinx Virtex FPGAs
with between 6 and 24 million reconfigurable gates
available on board.

Three variations on the TTMR algorithm were tested.
Czajkowski, Pagey, Goksel, Bozek
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